


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# War And The Art Of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success Into Political Victory



## Synopsis

Success in war ultimately depends on the consolidation of political order. Nadia Schadlow argues that the steps needed to consolidate a new political order are not separate from war. They are instead an essential component of war and victory. The challenge of governance operations did not start with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army's involvement in the political and economic reconstruction of states has been central to all its armed conflicts from large-scale conventional wars to so-called irregular or counterinsurgency wars. Yet, US policymakers and military leaders have failed to institutionalize lessons on how to consolidate combat gains into desired political outcomes. *War and the Art of Governance* examines fifteen historical cases of US Army military interventions, from the Mexican War through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improving future outcomes will require US policymakers and military leaders to accept that plans, timelines, and resources must be shaped to reflect this reality before they intervene in a conflict, not after things go wrong. Schadlow provides clear lessons for students and scholars of security studies and military history, as well as for policymakers and the military personnel who will be involved in the next foreign intervention.

## Book Information

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## Customer Reviews

"Why is American military success on the battlefield not yielding successful political outcomes? In this critically crafted must-read before we enter another war, Dr. Schadlow lays out the post-combat

challenges no amount of denial will excuse, persuasively charting what history tells us is required for our military victories to achieve a better peace." — James Mattis, USMC (Ret.), Hoover Institution

Nadia Schadlow is a senior program officer in the International Security and Foreign Policy Program of the Smith Richardson Foundation. She has published articles about national security in the Wall Street Journal, ForeignPolicy.com, The American Interest, Parameters, War on the Rocks, and elsewhere. She has a PhD from Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Not easiest of reads if you are not into military strategy but right on the money. Failure of unity of command and recognition of need to stabilize rear areas was big failure of Iraq and Afghanistan

Outstanding research and good writing.

Yogi Berra once pointed out, "In theory, theory should work in practice. In practice, it doesn't!" Nowhere does this truism apply more than in the mistaken theory espoused by both military and civilian leaders that the job of the military ends when the shooting stops. In "War and the Art of Governance", Nadia Schadlow does a masterful job of detailing the long history of American failures and successes in consolidating combat gains into desired political outcomes. With each of the 15 examples Dr. Schadlow cites, beginning with the Mexican-American War, through to Iraq and Afghanistan, she addresses how the ever-present debate and angst over the role of the military versus the role of civilian authority in establishing post-conflict order typically cause (i) a failure to adequately plan for the "day after," (ii) a lack of adequate resources to conduct such activities, (iii) a lack of unity of command, (iv) the lack of a cadre of people trained to execute such objectives and (v) a lack of retention of lessons learned and general expertise. The author acknowledges the theoretical concerns on both sides of the military/civilian authority debate, but points out, in case after case, that no other organization but the Army has the capacity, structure and understanding of the domain to map an organizationally seamless transition to a post-conflict stabilization. With respect to the current wars in which the U.S. continues to be engaged after nearly 16 years, Dr. Schadlow points out how both the Bush and the Obama administrations failed to address the critical ongoing requirements for stabilization strategies. Further, Schadlow, indicates that the U.S. made the same

mistakes yet again when we overthrew Qaddafi without a plan to stabilize Libya. Such judgments by Schadlow are not from 20/20 hindsight but follow detailed official Army assessments of prior experiences in our history and the importance of not repeating such mistakes. Of particular note is the report she references by COL Irwin L Hunt after WWI, "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920," in which he challenged the Army to develop competence in civilian administration among its officers in peacetime, and not wait until the responsibility was thrust upon it. As described in post WWII US Army history publications such as "The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946," written by Dr. Earle Ziemke, senior military leaders took Hunt's warnings to heart and began planning for post-war occupations of Italy, Germany and Japan in the spring of 1942, a full three years prior to the end of the wars in both theatres. Given the commitment by the Army to preparation for occupation and its allocation of people and resources, the radical transformation of Italy, Germany and Japan from totalitarian adversaries of the U.S. to stable allies stand as strong testaments to the competence of the U.S. Army to conduct such complex and essential operations. Dr. Schadlow does not make the case that the U.S. must impose its system or always engage in elaborate state building. However, she argues that the use of military force, described by practitioners as "the management of violence," removes and destroys but does not reconstruct. And, without reconstruction, the use of violence can perpetuate (or increase-my words, not hers) rather than reduce the national security threats the force was intended to eliminate. These are the hard but necessary evaluations that civilian and military leaders must make when considering the use of military force. Put simply by Dr. Schadlow, "It is an opprobrious waste of lives if nothing better results. Anyone, professional or amateur, who claims to have an interest or role in military strategy should read this book. In fact, before he came out of retirement into the SecDef role, James Mattis described Dr. Schadlow's book on the back cover as a "must read before we enter another war," where she "lays out the post-combat challenges no amount of denial will excuse, persuasively charting what history tells us is required for our military victories to achieve a better peace." Given the reputation Mattis has as a scholar with an extensive collection of books, I suspect that he had already read the Hunt Report and Ziemke's book before he read "War and the Art of Governance." My guess is that any officer or political leader who brings a plan into Secretary Mattis's office that involves taking and holding land for any period of time will want to have read this book, committed to memory the five recommendations Dr. Schadlow sets

forth in her conclusions, and have a detailed plan for the "day after" that addresses what, why, who, how and when.

Excellent. Nadia lets the facts speak for themselves. Based on careful research. This has greatly increased my appreciation for those in our military who are students of what has worked and why.

A stunning new work of U.S. military history and a tour de force of policy analysis from Dr Nadia Shadlow, a seasoned expert in security studies who brings clarity to the persistent debate about military intervention and nation building. If you want one book to explain the long arc of U.S. military policy and strategy, current debates and the path forward, then Dr Shadlow's book is for you.

While I agree with Dr. Nadia Schadlow (*War and the Art of Governance*, (2017)) that the U.S. consolidates combat success poorly, her analysis of the Panama experience (1989) is both philosophically and technically flawed. She found all of the "source material," much of which I have seen, but she makes two mistakes. First, she assumed the contemporary authors had no axe to grind and that they themselves correctly interpreted what their sources were telling them. She hides the real downstream flaws produced in this case by a lack of "national policy" on these issues. Second, there is at least two researcher faux pas between pages 194-219. As to the first, interpretative researchers years after historical events seek confirmation of their own world view. That's how Columbus can become an economic disaster, George Washington can be dismissed as merely another slave-holder, and Attila the Hun can be the Father of his Country. In today's book market, it sells. Specifically, with regard to Panama, most contemporary writers were chaffing over the effects of Goldwater-Nichols and the reorganization bringing non-Special Forces Army units, like Civil Affairs, into Special Operations. She makes little note that the original "plan" was to establish military government in Panama, ala post-World War II Germany. This was a doctrinal template that would be gone by the end of 1990 and the senior CA leaders in the USAR knew it. She also failed to show the real effects of needing to drag the U.S. Department of State through every phase of the operation. The simple fact is, we will fail at these efforts (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan), until we have a true "national policy," not just a DoD policy on matters related to Civil Affairs (and incidentally PSYOP, too). In today's world (I hate that term), service and joint doctrine and DoD policy pronouncements are not enough. International relations is truly an interagency endeavor. ALL of the functions of government must be fully engaged. That's why it's called WAR! As to flawed research, if the establishment of the Military Support Group (MSG) in Panama was instrumental in what

happened after Noriega was captured, wouldn't you think that the author would want to know and state who was that "senior civil affairs specialist" (p. 199) who was sent to evaluate and make recommendations on any post-conflict CA organization? How did that "specialist" come to offer a MSG to his hosts? Wouldn't you also think that any researcher may want to understand what that "specialist" faced within General Thurman's staff? Further, even a mediocre writer and certainly a competent editor would see that it was highly unlikely that two officers with a rare surname of "Youmans" would be in Panama during this short period of time. Who was there, "Harry" (p.199, Fn.178) or "Harold" (p. 200, Fn. 186)? I was misidentified. This simple error raised the point: what other errors have crept into the book?

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